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The Changing Nature of Employment and the Reform of Labor and 
Social Security Legislation in Post-Apartheid South Africa1 
 
Kumiko MAKINO 
 
 
The struggle against apartheid in South Africa reached its peak in the 1980s, as 
more and more people were mobilized through trade unions, religious organizations, 
residents’ associations called “civics,” and other civil society organizations all over the 
country. The mobilization for the struggle spread so widely that the National Party 
government was no longer able to suppress the movement by force. The criticism of 
apartheid from the international community heightened as well, and economic sanctions 
against South Africa were implemented by major countries from the mid-1980s, 
severely affecting the South African economy and making the cost of maintenance of 
the apartheid system prohibitively high. As a result, the government made a decision to 
initiate negotiations with the anti-apartheid forces, released Nelson Mandela, and lifted 
the ban on the African National Congress (ANC) and other liberation movements in 
1990. After prolonged negotiations, the first non-racial general elections were held in 
1994, and the transition from an apartheid regime to democracy was realized. 
The labor movement played a significant role in the anti-apartheid struggle in the 
1980s as well as in the negotiation process in the early 1990s (Adler and Webster 2000). 
The role of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the biggest labor 
organization, established in the mid-1980s, was of particular importance. Although it 
was not a direct ally of the ANC in the 1980s, COSATU supported the Freedom Charter, 
and its activism concerned not only bread-and-butter issues but also political liberation. 
                                                  
1 This paper is a translated and edited version of my article, “Minami-Afurika ni okeru 
Hi-seiki-koyo no Zoka to Rodo-ho Shakai-hosho Seido Kaikaku (in Japanese),” in Koichi Usami ed. 
Shinko Kogyo-koku ni okeru Koyo to Shakai-hosho [Transformation of Employment and Social 
Security in the Newly Industrializing Countries], Kenkyu sosho (IDE Research Series) No.565, 
Chiba: IDE-JETRO, 2007, pp.147-181. The original article was submitted in February 2007, and 
developments since then are not reflected in this paper. 
 1
After the removal of the ban on the ANC, COSATU formally allied itself with the ANC 
and the South African Communist Party (SACP). These three organizations form the 
tripartite alliance through which the ANC has overwhelmingly won three general 
elections since 1994. In the labor law reforms in the post-apartheid era, COSATU has 
succeeded in winning significant protection of workers by use of its political influence 
in the new government. 
At the same time, destabilization of employment has also taken place recently. 
Since the beginning of the political transition, South Africa has been rapidly integrated 
into the global economy, and there has been strong pressure on the South African labor 
market in the direction of flexibilization and deregulation. As was typically seen for 
African mineworkers who worked on a contract basis, flexible and insecure 
employment has been practiced for a long time in South Africa. In addition to the 
classical type of non-standard employment, there is a growing trend towards 
outsourcing employment, avoiding direct employment relations by utilizing labor 
brokers and “independent contractors” (Bezuidenhout et al. 2004; Kenny and Webster 
1999; Theron and Godfrey 2000; Theron et al. 2005; Webster and Von Holdt 2005). 
Social protection for workers in non-standard employment is significantly inferior 
compared to workers in standard employment, due to the insecure nature of 
employment as well as the lack of social security arrangements associated with 
employment such as medical schemes and retirement provisions. 
This paper tries to understand these changes that are taking place simultaneously in 
opposite directions in the context of the characteristics of labor and social security 
legislation in South Africa, as well as the nature of labor and social security reforms 
after democratization. We put emphasis on the corporatist nature of labor policy-making 
as the factor influencing the course of reforms. Specifically, we will focus on the 
process of the reforms of labor and social security legislation which have been carried 
forward through consensus-making between the government, business and labor 
representatives at the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC). 
As for the definition of corporatism, the two most well-known conceptualizations are 
that of Schmitter (1979=1984), who defined corporatism as a system of interest 
representation and intermediation, and that of Lehmbruch (1979=1984), who saw 
corporatism as an institutional pattern of policy-formation; we will follow the latter 
definition and understand corporatism as a process of policy-making and 
implementation where large interest groups cooperate with each other and with public 
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authorities. NEDLAC was established in 1995 as a platform for “social dialogue” 
between the representatives of government, business, labor and community. As of 2007, 
organized business is represented by the Business Unity South Africa (BUSA), and 
organized labor by the three main labor federations in South Africa: COSATU, the 
National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU), and the Federation of Unions of South 
Africa (FEDUSA). It is a unique feature of NEDLAC that, in addition to the 
conventional tripartite partners, it includes the community constituency, which is 
represented by national organizations of civics, youth, women, disabled people and so 
on. The role of the community constituency, however, is limited because it takes part in 
only the Development Chamber out of the four chambers of NEDLAC: Development, 
Trade and Industry, Public Finance and Monetary Policy, and Labor Market. 
According to the NEDLAC Act, NEDLAC considers and seeks to reach 
consensuses about “all proposed labour legislation relating to labour market policy 
before it is introduced in Parliament” as well as “all significant changes to social and 
economic policy before it is implemented or introduced in Parliament” (Section 5). In 
fact, not all significant socio-economic policy changes have been considered at 
NEDLAC before being introduced, as is exemplified by the process of the introduction 
in 1996 of an important macroeconomic strategy, Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution (GEAR), in which NEDLAC played no role. However, as for changes in 
labor legislation, for which discussions by NEDLAC are mandatory before submission 
to Parliament, policy- making has been based on consensus reached between 
government, business, and labor.2 The contents of labor law reform in the post-apartheid 
era therefore reflect points of compromise between organized business and labor, 
balancing the flexibility of the labor market, which is preferable for business, and the 
protection of workers’ rights, which is the central demand of labor. The balance taken, 
however, has been between the interests of organized workers and their employers, and 
not a result of the process where “all key stakeholders in the South African society and 
economy” are ensured effective participation in the formulation of policy, as was 
envisioned when NEDLAC was established.3 In a society like South Africa, where the 
                                                  
2 Not all consensuses were made through formal NEDLAC processes, some being reached through 
bilateral negotiations between organized business and labor, as well as other various informal 
consultations. 
3 Speech of Labour Minister Tito Mboweni at the second reading debate of the National Economic 
Development and Labour Council Bill at the National Assembly, 14 November 1994, Debate of the 
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unemployment rate is extremely high and the unionization rate of workers in 
non-standard employment is low, the representativeness of organized labor participating 
in corporatist mechanisms becomes problematic (Buhlungu 2006; Webster 2006). What 
is important for the theme of this paper is that organized labor and business do have a 
corporatist means for their interests to be reflected in policies, while unemployed and 
unorganized workers have no such means. Corporatism has been criticized in South 
Africa for its undemocratic nature due to the centralization of power in a small number 
of elites as well as the risk of marginalization of unorganized vulnerable people (Von 
Holdt 1993). It was against this backdrop that the community constituency was included 
in NEDLAC to increase its inclusivity. However, as stated above, the community 
constituency participates only in the Development Chamber, and does not engage in 
labor policy making. 
Our central argument is that the apparently contradictive changes--labor policy 
reform in the direction of better protection of workers’ rights, and the increase in 
flexible and insecure employment--can be explained consistently by the corporatist 
labor policy-making process which has been practiced notwithstanding the problem of 
representativeness. The remainder of this paper will demonstrate our argument by 
examining how the working conditions and social security of workers in non-standard 
employment have been dealt with in the series of labor and social security reforms in 
the post-apartheid period. This paper is structured as follows. Section 1 will summarize 
major arguments concerning the South African labor market and the increase of 
non-standard employment (flexibilization and informalization). Section 2 will describe 
the outlines of South African labor and social security legislation and show how 
workers in non-standard employment are positioned within them. Section 3 examines 
the process of labor and social security reforms in the post-apartheid period and argues 
that, although the protection of workers’ rights has been generally strengthened, the 
significance of reforms for workers in non-standard employment has been limited. 
Finally, we will conclude by examining the factors that have led to the delay of reforms 
concerning workers in non-standard employment. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
National Assembly (Hansard), p.4273. 
 4
1. Characteristics of the South African Labor Market and Transformation of 
Employment Relations 
 
The South African labor market is evaluated by some as rigid and by others as 
flexible. It is regarded as rigid if the focus is on high wages due to strong trade 
unionism and the centralized collective bargaining system (Moll 1996), yet it is seen as 
flexible in terms of the high rate of non-standard employment (Standing et al. 1996). 
Diagnosis and prescriptions for problems with the labor market differ depending on 
which aspects are focused on; some would argue the rigidity of the labor market is the 
cause of the high unemployment rate and thus flexibilization of the labor market is 
necessary for job creation, yet others would argue it is the poor working conditions of 
workers in non-standard employment that is problematic and the policy challenge is 
how to strengthen and widen worker protection. The former argument is supported by 
organized business while the latter is supported by labor, and the dispute is as 
ideological as it is factual. 
According to the Labour Force Survey (LFS), the unemployment rate in South 
Africa is above 25% even according to the official definition; if including discouraged 
work seekers, over 40% of the labor force is unemployed (Statistics South Africa 2006). 
The unemployment rate differs according to race and gender; the highest being for 
African women, and the lowest for white men. Since unemployment is closely related to 
poverty (Bhorat et al. 2001), the extremely high unemployment rate has attracted the 
attention of many scholars. Job creation and poverty alleviation are also top priorities 
for the South African government, which has set a goal of halving unemployment and 
poverty by 2014 in its policy document, Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for 
South Africa (ASGISA), published in 2006. 
There are various analyses of the factors of the high unemployment rate in South 
Africa. Bhorat points out that the absolute number of those in employment is increasing 
yet the unemployment rate rises because the pace of new participation in the labor 
market overwhelms the increase in employment (Bhorat 2004; Bhorat and Oosthuizen 
2006). From political and institutional points of view, strong trade unionism and labor 
market regulations have been blamed for pushing up wages and thus for the high 
unemployment rate. What is characteristic of the labor market regulations in South 
Africa is the collective bargaining system; basic working conditions such as minimum 
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wages and social security are determined at bargaining councils (previously called 
industrial councils), which are permanent collective bargaining institutions established 
by employer and employee organizations in a specific industry, and the agreements 
made there bind not only the members of bargaining councils but also parties in the 
same industry who do not participate in the negotiations. It has been argued that such a 
centralized bargaining system has the effect of pushing up wages and has hindered job 
creation, especially in small- and medium-sized enterprises (Moll 1996). At the same 
time, however, there are objections to arguments that claim the rigidity of the labor 
market is the main reason for the high unemployment rate, focusing instead on 
problems of industrial structure and its low capacity for employment absorption (Hirsch 
2005: 174-184; Hirano 1999; Rodrick 2006). 
Another dimension of the labor market appears if we go beyond the dichotomy of 
employed and unemployed, and pay more attention to various ways of working. The 
policy challenge of the reduction of unemployment and job creation is mainly about the 
quantity of employment; meanwhile the problem of non-standard employment, which is 
the theme of this paper, is more concerned with the quality of employment. So far, the 
problem of the quality of employment has been largely ignored compared to that of the 
quantity of employment. However, the issue of quality of employment is important as 
non-standard employment is increasing in South Africa, just as elsewhere in the world, 
against the backdrop of globalization. 
This change however is difficult to grasp through statistics. Official figures 
regarding non-standard employment, such as terms of employment (permanent or not), 
became available only after 2000 when Statistics South Africa started to publish LFS, 
and even after the introduction of LFS, there are criticisms that the questionnaires are 
not adequate to grasp the reality of employment conditions and tend to underestimate 
the scale of non-standard employment. For instance, the estimated number of temporary 
workers according to LFS March 2003 was 167,486, which is less than half of the 
estimate made by an association of labor brokers, the Confederation of Associations of 
Private Employment Sector (CAPES) (Theron el al. 2005: 9-11). 
Therefore, there is a limit to how far the real scale of non-standard employment 
can be grasped through statistical data, yet there is a consensus among the government, 
labor, and business sectors that the non-standardization of employment is progressing. 
At the Growth and Development Summit in 2003, NEDLAC constituencies agreed that 
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engagement would be required as to “measures to promote decent work and to address 
the problem of casualisation” (NEDLAC 2003: 29), after which the “changing nature of 
work and atypical forms of employment” became one of the items on the agenda at the 
Labor Market Chamber of NEDLAC. 
As for the informal sector, although it is an accepted notion that the South African 
informal sector is relatively small compared to other countries of a similar economic 
level (Kingdon and Knight 2004), it has been pointed out that recently the 
informalization of employment is progressing in parallel to the flexibilization of 
employment (Valodia 2001). Casale et al. (2004), who analyzed the trend of the 
informal sector from 1995 to 2003, while agreeing with Bhorat’s finding that the 
absolute number in employment is on the rise, points out that more than 60% of the 
employment increase in the period was in the informal sector. Bezuidenhout et al. 
(2004) summarizes the phenomenon of the non-standardization of employment in South 
Africa as a combined effect of casualization (increase in temporary and part-time 
employment), externalization (outsourcing, subcontracting, and utilization of labor 
brokers) and the informalization of employment, which suggests that flexibilization and 
informalization are not two different phenomena, but are deeply related to each other, 
drastically changing the quality of employment in South Africa. When we refer to 
workers in non-standard employment in this paper, we mean not only workers in the 
formal sector who do not work full-time on a permanent basis, but also include 
externalized workers and workers in the informal sector. 
Diagnosis and prescriptions for the problems of the South African labor market 
inevitably differ depending on whether we focus on the quantity or quality of 
employment. For those who claim that the labor market regulations are the principal 
cause of the high unemployment rate, deregulating the labor market is desirable for job 
creation, lowering of the unemployment rate, and poverty reduction. Such a diagnosis 
has been repeatedly proposed by the business sector. The typical example is “Growth 
for All”, a document published by the South African Foundation in 1996, which asserted 
that “the South African labour market is one of the most rigid in the world” and the high 
wages for unionized workers are sustained by the “Continental-type industrial relations 
systems” which prevent the creation of low-wage jobs. Therefore, the document argued 
for a two-tier labor market in which, besides the existing high-wage capital-intensive 
sector, a free entry flexible wage sector with minimum labor standards would be 
allowed (South African Foundation 1996: vii). 
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As a counterargument, the labor constituency of NEDLAC published “Social 
Equity and Job Creation,” which asserted that it was retrenchment and overhasty trade 
liberalization that were the causes of increased unemployment, and argued for more 
protection of workers’ rights, as well as job creation and redistribution through 
budgetary measures (COSATU et al. 1996). Such an argument against deregulating the 
labor market by trade unions has been often criticized as based on the self-interest of 
organized workers. For instance, Seekings and Nattrass (2005) depict the situation 
where the interests of organized workers and the unorganized unemployed are different 
and the former has managed to protect and promote their interests at the expense of the 
latter. According to Seekings and Nattrass, the line which separates “insiders” and 
“outsiders” has changed since the end of 1970s, from race (whites as insiders and blacks 
as outsiders) to class (those with jobs as insiders and whose without jobs as outsiders). 
With democratization, all racial discrimination in legislation was eliminated, yet it did 
not mean the coming of an egalitarian society. Some blacks were now included in the 
insiders, yet the majority of blacks were left excluded, and the unequal nature of society 
remains the same. 
The picture Seekings and Nattrass present is rather dichotomist in its way of 
categorizing participants in the labor market into insiders and outsiders; those who have 
jobs being insiders and those who do not being outsiders. They depict insiders typically 
as organized workers who enjoy relatively high wages and stable employment, and not 
workers in non-standard employment. This is not unreasonable considering that their 
focus of analysis is more on historical rather than contemporary aspects of inequality 
and unemployment; i.e. the characteristics of the “distributional regime” which was 
shaped under apartheid but maintains its influence even now. “Distributional regime” is 
a concept originated by Seekings and Nattrass. Based on Esping-Andersen’s concept of 
“welfare regime,” they construct the concept of “distributional regime” as consisting of 
economic policy (growth path strategies), labor market institutions, and redistribution 
through taxation and cash transfer, and argue that the “distributional regime” shapes the 
distributional outcome of the society. Their concept put more emphasis on the influence 
of labor market institutions on distributional outcome than that of Esping-Andersen’s. 
Although their analysis is mostly historical, they give one chapter over to the 
post-apartheid distributional regime and argue that the interests of organized labor, 
especially COSATU, are more easily reflected in policies, while those of unorganized 
unemployed and the poor are not. As a result, labor market deregulation does not 
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progress and therefore job creation is hindered (Seekings and Nattrass 2005). 
Nonetheless, if we focus on the increase of non-standard employment, a somewhat 
different view from the dichotomist views of the employed and unemployed are 
required. Von Holdt and Webster (2005) argue that, as a result of work restructuring 
against the backdrop of globalization, the post-apartheid South African labor market can 
be categorized into three zones, which they respectively call core, non-core, and 
periphery. Included in the “core” zone are full-time workers in the formal sector, similar 
to the “insiders” of Seekings and Nattrass; the “non-core” zone, which lies just outside 
of the “core” zone, includes outsourced, temporary, part-time, and domestic workers; 
workers in the informal sector and the unemployed are in the “periphery” zone which is 
at the outer edge. The increase in non-standard employment is understood in this 
schema as an expansion of the “non-core” zone (shrinkage of the “core” zone) and 
marginalization of employment (a shift of employment from “core” to “non-core” and 
from “non-core” to “periphery”). From this schema, what is depicted as problematic is 
the difference in terms of workers’ rights and protection depending on which zone one 
is located in. While workers in the “core” zone enjoy stable employment and relatively 
high wages, the jobs of “non-core” workers are generally unstable and low-waged, and, 
although their rights as workers have improved on paper through the series of labor law 
reforms, they seldom enjoy practical protection of their rights. The increase in 
“non-core” workers in turn threatens the working conditions of “core” workers (Von 
Holdt and Webster 2005: 29). In such an understanding, the goal to be sought is an 
expansion of protection and rights which “core” workers are enjoying to “non-core” and 
“periphery” workers and a reduction in the difference in levels of protection between 
the zones, rather than a deregulation of labor market and a further erosion of the “core” 
zone. This is basically in line with the position of organized labor. 
In sum, organized business asserts that the current labor market regulation hinders 
job creation; while organized labor argues for more protection of workers. As stated 
above, the difference between the two is almost ideological and agreement is never 
reached. This paper does not intend to integrate or find a compromise between these 
different positions; our interest is in how non-standard employment has increased, and 
how and to what extent labor and social security reform for workers in non-standard 
employment has progressed against the backdrop of the contradicting positions of 
organized business and labor. 
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 2. Non-Standard Employment in Labor and Social Security Legislation 
 
This section outlines the current South African labor and social security legislation 
and how workers in non-standard employment are dealt with within the legislation, as 
preparation for the next section, which examines post-apartheid labor and social security 
reform with a focus on workers in non-standard employment. Generally speaking, 
although there are some exceptions, workers in non-standard employment and standard 
employment are treated equally. However, the effectiveness of regulations differs, and 
the actual level of rights and protection which workers in non-standard employment 
enjoy is significantly inferior to that for workers in standard employment. 
 
2.1 Non-standard employment and labor legislation 
The two most basic South African labor laws are the Labour Relations Act (LRA) 
and the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA). LRA is concerned with labor 
relations in general, including the rights of trade unions, collective bargaining, strikes 
and lockouts, unfair labor practices, and procedures for labor disputes, and regulates the 
collective bargaining institutions called bargaining councils (BC), in which registered 
trade unions and employers’ organizations negotiate for basic working conditions for a 
specific industry. If the trade unions and employers’ organizations which are members 
of a BC are sufficiently representative of the sector, collective agreements at the BC 
bind non-parties within the same sector. The history of LRA dates back to 1924 when 
the centralized collective bargaining system through industrial councils (IC) was 
introduced by the Industrial Conciliation Act. Despite the change in name, the functions 
of IC and BC are basically the same. 
There is no unified minimum wage in South Africa, sectoral minimum wages being 
set by BC agreements. BCEA establishes unified minimum standards as to working time, 
payment for overtime work, paid leave and so on, yet most of the standards can be 
varied downwards if there are BC agreements. For sectors not covered by BCs, the 
Minister of Labour can determine the basic conditions of employment such as minimum 
wage, working time, paid leave, and conditions of termination of employment. So far 
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such sectoral determinations have been made, for instance, for domestic workers, farm 
workers, and contract cleaning. 
Except that certain regulations of BCEA, such as those on working time, are not 
applied to employees who work for an employer for less than 24 hours a month, BCEA 
and LRA are equally applied to workers in standard employment and non-standard 
employment. BC agreements and sectoral determinations by the Labour Minister are 
also applied equally. However, as we will see in more detail in the next section, there 
are problems of effectiveness of labor regulations, especially for those in non-standard 
employment. 
 
2.2 Non-standard employment and social security 
The social security system in South Africa is characterized by its dual character; on 
the one hand, private retirement provisions (pension funds and provident funds) and 
medical schemes are highly developed, and on the other hand, there is a large-scale 
public cash transfer system through means-tested social grants for the elderly, disabled 
people, and for children. The South African medical system is also dualistic and sharply 
divided into public and private sectors. The medical standards of private hospitals are 
quite high though treatment is costly; free treatment is available for poor people at 
public health facilities, yet these are generally understaffed and waiting times tend to be 
quite long. 
As for compulsory statutory insurance, there are Unemployment Insurance and 
Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases. All employees have to be 
registered for the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) except for workers working for 
an employer for less than 24 hours a month, learners (apprentices), public servants, 
foreigners working on contract, workers receiving a state old age pension, and workers 
who only earn commission. If workers are injured, disabled, killed, or become ill, they 
receive compensation from the Compensation Fund, except for workers who are totally 
or partially disabled for less than three days, domestic workers, anyone receiving 
military training, members of the South African National Defence Force or South 
African Police Service, any worker guilty of willful misconduct, unless they are 
seriously disabled or killed, anyone employed outside South Africa for 12 or more 
continuous months, and workers working mainly outside South Africa and only 
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temporarily employed in the country. While both employers and employees contribute 
to the UIF, contributions to the Compensation Fund are made only by employers. 
Although not compulsory, provisions for private pensions and medical schemes for 
employees are in general included in BC agreements.  
According to an estimate by the National Treasury (2004), between 66% and 84% 
of formal sector workers participate in private retirement provisions schemes. 
Participation levels for medical schemes is lower because some employees (especially if 
their wage is not high) choose not to be enrolled in medical schemes due to the high 
cost and considered low benefit.4 There are significant differences in the coverage of 
retirement provisions and medical schemes for workers in standard and non-standard 
employment in the formal sector. According to an ILO study, while 69.1% of regular 
workers of 340 manufacturing firms are covered by pension funds, only 23.5% of 
part-time workers and 8.9% of temporary workers are covered. The figures for medical 
schemes are respectively 74.9%, 30.3%, and 11.1% (Standing et al 1996: table 9.2). It is 
reported that temporary workers are often not registered for the UIF and the 
Compensation Fund, in spite of it being compulsory for employers to do so (Department 
of Labour 2006: 6.11). Furthermore, there is no social security associated with 
employment for independent contractors and workers in the informal sector. Therefore, 
most workers in non-standard employment end up being dependent on the public social 
security system. 
 
3. Labor and Social Security Reform and Non-standard Employment 
 
3.1 Strengthening of workers’ rights and protection through labor law reform 
After democratization, the South African government pursued economic 
liberalization, as was symbolized by the introduction in 1996 of the new 
macroeconomic strategy, GEAR. As a point of departure, GEAR noted the necessity for 
greater labor market flexibility for transformation towards a competitive economy that 
could yield economic growth of 6% per annum. At the same time, however, it was noted 
                                                  
4 Interview with Mr. Thulani Lucas Mthiyane (National Engineering Sector 
Coordinator, National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa: NUMSA) on October 30, 
2006. 
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that the extension of basic rights to a broader pool of the work force should be done in 
parallel with flexibilization of the labor market to facilitate employment creation 
(Department of Finance 1996: 1.3, 2.3). The core task of labor market reform has been 
to strike a delicate balance between flexibilization and workers’ protection, which can 
be summed up as “regulated flexibility” (Department of Labour 1996). Since the 
starting point for the labor market reform was apartheid legislation, strengthening 
workers’ rights and protection, rather than flexibilization, has progressed more in the 
process of reform as a whole. 
In the apartheid era, African workers were excluded from the definition of 
“employee” and prohibited from forming trade unions and participating in collective 
bargaining. This was changed by amendments to labor legislation after the Wiehahn 
Commission report at the end of 1970s, which recommended that Africans should be 
allow to register trade unions, leading to labor movement intensification in the 1980s. 
However, politicized trade unions which had strong links with anti-apartheid 
movements were harshly oppressed, and many trade union leaders were arrested and 
detained. The right to strike without fear of being dismissed was only established by the 
introduction of the new LRA in 1995 (Bendix 2004: 83). 
The LRA was among the important items of legislation which were enacted soon 
after democratization, and one of the first items that NEDLAC dealt with (NEDLAC 
2005:34). There were many points of issue which labor and business disputed, yet as a 
whole, the Act reflected more of the demands of labor than those of business (Baskin 
and Satgar 1996; COSATU Parliamentary Office 2000: 21-27). In the background of 
such speedy enactment of LRA was the fact that the representatives of government, 
labor, and business had agreed as early as 1990 to the principle that a new LRA would 
be drafted upon extensive consultation and with the consensus of labor and business.5 
Policy making based upon consensus-seeking among stakeholders was not practiced 
before the democratic transition; under apartheid regime, black people were excluded 
from political power, and, even among whites, there was increasing centralization of 
power to the executive branch of the government and marginalization of the parliament 
during the political crisis of the 1980s. The apartheid government did listen to the 
                                                  
5 Minute of a Meeting between Representatives of the Working Party and the Minister of Manpower 
Held at the Office of the Minister in Pretoria on 13 and 14 September 1990 (Laboria Minute), 
accessed at the COSATU Archive (Johannesburg) in October 2006. 
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opinions of white interest groups, yet decision-making in the late-apartheid period was 
characterized by secrecy and authoritarianism, and consensus among stakeholders was 
not sought even for important policy changes (Houston et al. 2001). 
COSATU, which was formed in the mid-1980s with mostly black members, moved 
for the formation of a corporatist forum once the negotiation for transition started in 
1990, so that the government at the time would not change important socio-economic 
policies unilaterally before the transition took place (Habib 1997; Webster and Adler 
1999; Maree 1993). It was the labor movement that took the initiative, yet organized 
business also found some merit in the proposals for the sake of stabilization of labor 
relations against the backdrop of potential racial tensions at workplaces where 
employers were mostly white and employees were mostly black (Friedman and Shaw 
2000). Against such a background, the National Economic Forum and the restructured 
National Manpower Commission were formed during the negotiation process, based on 
which NEDLAC was formed after the transition took place. 
In the process of the establishment of the new LRA, there were some minor 
amendments during the parliamentary committee, yet the amendments were not 
substantial and the NEDLAC agreements were respected. As stated above, it is 
obligatory for NEDLAC to consider and seek to reach consensuses about all proposed 
labor legislation before it is introduced in the Parliament. Agreements reached at 
NEDLAC do not have legal binding force, yet there is an unwritten rule that Parliament 
respects the agreements and does not make significant amendments. This is a salient 
feature of labor policy making in South Africa, and all the new labor legislation and 
amendments after democratization have basically followed the same process; i.e., firstly, 
the government prepares draft bills, and secondly, the representatives of organized 
business and labor discuss and reach consensus and compromise in the Labour Market 
Chamber of NEDLAC or at other forums,6 and lastly the bill is introduced in the 
Parliament, which passes the bill into law without major amendments. 
More developments followed the new LRA for strengthening workers rights and 
protection. The new constitution, which was enacted in 1996, established workers’ 
rights to form and join trade unions, to strike, and to engage in collective bargaining, 
                                                  
6 There were some cases where negotiations outside of NEDLAC were important. For instance, 
amendments to LRA and BCEA in 2002 were based on bilateral negotiation between business and 
labor at the Millennium Labour Council, and not the tripartite negotiation at NEDLAC. 
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which are rights that everyone should enjoy without exception as they are part of the 
Bill of Rights. The new BCEA in 1997 set the minimum working conditions for all 
kinds of workers including domestic workers and farm workers, who were excluded in 
the previous BCEA. Except that certain provisions are not applied to employees who 
work for an employer for less than 24 hours a month, BCEA is applied equally to 
workers in both standard and non-standard employment, and rights and protection for 
part-time workers were extended compared to the previous BCEA. In 1998, two further 
important items of labor legislation, the Employment Equity Act, which includes 
provisions about affirmative action for blacks, women and disabled people, and the 
Skills Development Act, aiming to improve skill levels of workers, were enacted. 
Through these reforms and the introduction of new legislation, South African labor 
regulations as a whole have shifted towards the extension of protection for workers who 
had been previously excluded. 
 
3.2 Expansion of the social safety net 
The Bill of Rights of the new constitution established that everyone has the right to 
access to “social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their 
dependants, appropriate social assistance” (Section 27(1)). Similar to labor legislation, 
reform of the social security system has also progressed towards the extension of 
protection for people who were excluded from the social safety net under the apartheid 
regime. 
Firstly, there was a reform of social grants for children in 1998. Social grants for 
children at that time were discriminatory and African households were virtually 
excluded from access to them. The newly introduced Child Support Grant was equally 
accessible for households of all races, and the number of recipients rapidly increased. 
By 2006, the total number of recipients of social grants including the Old Age Grant, 
Disability Grant and Child Support Grant became more than 10 million (Manuel 2006). 
Another important reform concerned Unemployment Insurance. By the new 
Unemployment Insurance Act, which was enacted in 2001, employers are now obliged 
to register domestic workers and seasonal workers for the UIF. Seasonal workers are by 
definition non-standard employment, and although not all domestic workers are 
non-standard employment, Von Holdt and Webster (2005) regarded them as “non-core” 
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workers due to their extreme employment vulnerability. Therefore the Unemployment 
Insurance reform meant extension of social security for workers in unstable and 
vulnerable employment. However, this does not serve as income security for the 
long-term unemployed and those who have been never registered for the UIF, because 
unemployment benefits cover only those who have contributed to the UIF, and are paid 
only for a limited period. As an additional means to address the issue of income security 
for the unemployed, the government introduced a new public works program in 2004 
with a target of reaching 1 million people in five years. Access to the public works 
program is not a “right” of unemployed people, however, but the scale and locations of 
programs are determined according to budget constraints and necessity for projects. 
As Unemployment Insurance is under the jurisdiction of the Department of Labour, 
the contents of its reform were shaped through the NEDLAC process of consensus 
making. Meanwhile, social grants are under the jurisdiction of the Department of Social 
Development. Civil society organizations, including trade unions, churches, NGOs, and 
social movements did engage in policy discussion about social grant reforms, yet it was 
mainly through lobbying the government and ANC as well as utilization of the mass 
media that they were carried through, and the role of NEDLAC was limited. The 
decision making concerning social grant reforms has been made mainly by the 
government, and the opinions of labor, business, other civil society organizations and 
experts are only used as reference and do not bind government’s decisions (Makino 
2005). This is in contrast with the labor law reforms, where consensus of business and 
labor is required for any kind of change. 
 
3.3 Limits of reforms, focusing on workers in non-standard employment 
We have seen in previous sections that the labor and social security reforms after 
democratization were basically in the direction of strengthening and extending the 
protection and rights of workers in general. However, to have rights on paper and to 
enjoy the rights in reality are two different things. This is especially so for workers in 
non-standard employment. 
Firstly, labor legislation is only applied to those who are “employed,” and not to 
independent contractors who provide labor and services on contract. In fact, it is not 
always easy to distinguish between employment and service contracts, and firms often 
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prefer, even for same kind of work, to have service contracts with workers rather than 
employ them, so that labor legislation would not apply. As a response to this problem, 
LRA and BCEA were amended in 2002 so that any person who works for another 
person is presumed to be an employee, regardless of the form of contract, as long as the 
person is subject to the control or direction of the other person in terms of the manner in 
which the person works or hours of work, or the person is economically dependent on 
the other person for whom he or she works. 
LRA establishes that it is regarded as dismissal if an employee reasonably expected 
the employer to renew a fixed-term contract of employment on the same or similar 
terms, but the employer offered to renew it on less favorable terms, or did not renew it 
(Section 186(1)(b)). However, it is not difficult for an employer to force an employee to 
accept a contract which would not allow the employee to reasonably expect the 
employer to renew the contract on the same or similar terms. Temporary workers are 
vulnerable because of the complexity of employment relations and the difficulties 
involved in monitoring compliance. Theron et al. (2005: 29-31) points out that some 
labor brokers use contract forms with contents such as not allowing employees to have 
paid leave, or prohibit strikes. In addition, workers without written contracts and those 
who work informally and are not registered for Unemployment Insurance are more 
vulnerable and substantially outside of labor legislation regulations. 
Secondly, as for social security reform, most workers in standard employment do 
have retirement provisions and to a lesser extent medical schemes as well, as we have 
seen above. Income security for the non-labor force population and the unemployed also 
improved through social grant reforms and the extension of public works programs. 
However, there has been little progresses in terms of social security for those who work 
in non-standard employment. In early 2007, the government proposed a social security 
reform plan that included a compulsory retirement provision and a wage subsidy for 
low-wage earners (Mbeki 2007; Manuel 2007). There will be consultation with various 
stakeholders including organized business and labor before any decisions are made, and 
to what extent this proposed plan would cover workers in non-standard employment is 
not clear. Compulsory social health insurance or national health insurance has been also 
on the agenda for years (Department of Health 2002; Taylor Committee 2002: ch.8), yet 
it is still at the discussion stage and prospects remain uncertain. 
Lund (2002) points out that the social security system in South Africa does not fit 
 17
the needs of increasing numbers of workers in non-standard employment and the 
informal sector, as it has developed on the premise that most workers are in standard 
employment and unemployment takes place only temporarily. This is a historical 
problem, according to Lund, because the social security system in South Africa “was 
designed initially to protect the white population, especially the white working class” 
(p.181). White workers were protected from competition with black workers and their 
risk of long-term unemployment or inability to find other than unstable non-standard or 
informal jobs was minimized by discriminatory policies in the fields of education and 
labor market regulations. Social grant reforms after democratization brought about a 
rapid increase in recipients of grants, which has played a big role in poverty alleviation 
(Van der Berg et al. 2006). However, those who are entitled to social grants are limited 
to non-labor force people (the elderly, disabled, or children), and social grant reform did 
not address changes in the risk structure, such as the increase in long-term 
unemployment and non-standard employment. Public works programs do function, to a 
certain extent, as income security for the unemployed, yet the employment provided 
through the programs is only temporary and is not accompanied by social security such 
as the Unemployment Insurance. 
As seen above, Bezuidenhout et al. (2004) understands the increase in 
non-standard employment as a combination of casualization, externalization and 
informalization; in fact, all three of these processes do lower the effectiveness of labor 
regulations. The labor law reform, as a whole, strengthened workers’ rights and 
protection, yet at the same time an increase in non-standard employment has taken place, 
which means an increase in workers who do not substantially enjoy rights and 
protections under the new labor legislation and are excluded from social safety nets. In 
fact, it is the lack of regulations concerning non-standard employment itself that has 
enabled the increase in such unstable non-standard employment. Historically, the 
apartheid regime, which put African workers outside of protection by labor legislation 
and used them as a cheap, easily replaceable labor force, did not regulate the utilization 
of non-standard employment. After democratization, the protection of workers’ rights 
was strengthened, and this is on paper equally applied to non-standard workers as well, 
yet the utilization of non-standard employment itself has not been regulated at all up to 
the present. “Permanent temporary” workers are commonly observed, and there is no 
restriction on the type of business and period for which temporary workers can be used. 
Returning to the dispute concerning whether the South African labor market is 
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rigid or flexible, it can be said that it is rigid in terms of the wage level in the formal 
sector due to centralized collective bargaining through BCs and sectoral determinations 
by the Labour Minister. However, in terms of utilization of non-standard employment, 
the South African labor market has been quite flexible from the apartheid era to the 
present. If not, South African employers would not have been increasingly able to use 
flexible forms of labor to adapt to rapid economic liberalization. This is in contrast to 
many other countries where the flexibilization of employment relations were driven by 
deregulation of the labor market; in South Africa, labor law reform has been in the 
direction of the tightening of regulations, which paradoxically might have worked as an 
incentive for employers to use more non-standard employment so that the total labor 
cost would be suppressed (Department of Labour 2006: 16; COSATU Parliamentary 
Office 2000). 
Now that several major labor law reforms have been implemented, protection of 
workers in non-standard employment is one of the remaining issues for the Department 
of Labour. The Labour Minister stated in July 2006 that “I am of the view that the 
labour law should cushion and mitigate the adverse nature of atypical forms of 
employment and lack of protection for these workers” and “any proposed changes in the 
law in the next decade should ideally extend protection to vulnerable workers while 
balancing it with the needs of small employers” (Mdladlana 2006). The Department of 
Labour commissioned research about non-standard employment to Theron and other 
academics at the University of Cape Town in 2000 (Theron and Godfrey 2000). In 
addition, after the NEDLAC Growth and Development Summit in 2003, four additional 
research projects have been commissioned and implemented. Based upon these research 
results, a report particularly about the issue of non-standard employment was drafted by 
the Department of Labour in late 2006 (Department of Labour 2006), which will be 
discussed further in the Labour Market Chamber of NEDLAC. 
At the time of writing, it is not clear whether there will be another amendment to 
the labor laws. According to the various interviews with the officials of the Department 
of Labour, employers’ organizations, and trade unions, which the author conducted in 
October and November 2006, negotiations were taking place on two points; the 
formulation of a Code of Good Practice about who should be regarded as an 
“employee”, and the introduction of some form of regulation about labor brokering. The 
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Code of Good Practice was already agreed upon and published in December 2006,7 yet 
the future of regulation of labor brokering is uncertain. Organized business is against 
further labor law amendments to include such regulation, and hold to the opinion that 
what is needed to protect temporary workers is the improved effectiveness of, not 
amendments to, the current labor laws.8 In contrast, COSATU demands tightening of 
regulations concerning labor brokers by labor law amendments, as well as further 
regulation of fixed-term contracts (COSATU 2006). As any amendment of the labor 
laws requires a consensus between organized business and labor, labor law amendments 
in that direction are unlikely to take place in near future, and if any further regulation is 
introduced, it is likely to be some form of self-regulation. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This paper has tried to understand from the nature of labor and social security 
reforms after democratization the current status of the South African labor market, 
which is changing in contradictory directions, i.e. a strengthening of the rights and 
protection of workers at the same time as the flexibilization of employment. Although 
recent labor law reforms have as a whole have strengthened the rights and protection of 
workers, it is workers in standard employment who have benefited most, and the merit 
has not been shared equally with workers in non-standard employment. Regulation 
concerning non-standard employment itself has not progressed much, except for the 
establishment of the Code of Good Practice about who is regarded as an “employee,” 
and there is no regulation concerning the utilization of temporary workers in terms of 
the type of business, contract period, repeated renewal of contracts, and so on. In 
addition, as the basic structure of the social security system in South Africa has not 
changed since the apartheid era, in which it was designed to address the needs of white 
                                                  
7 “Code of Good Practice: Who Is an Employee,” General Notice 1774 of 2006, Government 
Gazette No.29445, 1 December 2006. Retrieved February 17, 2007 from 
http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/notices/2006/29445.pdf. 
8 Interview with Ms. Corinna Gardner (Chief Officer Social Policy, Business Unity South Africa) on 
October 23, 2006; interview with Mr. John Botha (Confederation of Associations of Private 
Employment Sector) on November 8, 2006. 
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workers who were mostly in standard employment, social security for the unemployed 
and workers in non-standard employment remains insufficient. 
Why has there not been much progress in terms of strengthening the rights and 
protection of non-standard workers? One answer would be that addressing 
unemployment, rather than non-standard employment, has been prioritized against the 
backdrop of the extremely high unemployment rate; yet this paper has focused on 
another aspect, i.e. the limits of corporatist policy making. As we have seen above, 
post-apartheid labor law reforms have been the consequences of consensus and 
compromise between organized business and labor. The issue of insufficient protection 
for workers in non-standard employment is a part of organized labor’s agenda, yet in 
reality it has been the working conditions for workers in standard employment, the main 
constituency of trade unions, that have been the primary focus of negotiations. Trade 
unions have not been indifferent about organizing workers in non-standard employment; 
for instance, COSATU adopted the recommendation of the September Commission in 
1997 that it should try to organize workers in flexible forms of employment in order to 
maintain its organizational base. However, there has not been much progress since then 
in the unionization rate of workers in non-standard employment in COSATU-affiliated 
trade unions (Webster 2006: 26). Although the issue of the protection of workers in 
non-standard employment has attracted more attention recently, it seems that the present 
labor legislation, which is acceptable for business because it is easy for employers to 
utilize non-standard employment and also for labor because the interests of workers in 
standard employment are protected, is the current equilibrium point reached as a result 
of a series of compromises between organized business and labor. 
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